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The bioeconomic analysis of endangered species without consumptive values can 
be problematic when analysed with density-dependent models that assume a 
fixed environment size.  Most bioeconomic models use harvest as a control 
variable, yet when modelling non-harvestable species, frequently the only 
variable under control of conservationists is the quantity of habitat to be made 
available.  The authors explore the implications of this in a model developed to 
analyse the potential population recovery of New Zealand’s yellow-eyed penguin.  
The penguin faces severe competition with man for the terrestrial resources 
required for breeding and has declined in population to perilously low levels. The 
model was developed to estimate the land use required for recovery and 
preservation of the species and to compare the results to current tourism-driven 
conservation efforts.  It is demonstrated that land may serve as a useful control 
variable in bioeconomic models and that such a model may be useful for 
determining whether sufficient incentives exist to preserve a species.  However, 
the model may generate less useful results for providing a specific estimate of the 
optimal allocation of land to such a species. 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The modelling of endangered species has developed principally out of the 
literature of fisheries economics.  For example, Clark (1973) bases his model of 
species extinction on Gordon’s (1954) seminal fisheries model in order to examine 
the conditions under which the elimination of a species may appear to be the 
most attractive policy to a resource owner.  This work forms the foundation of 
much of the species extinction modelling that has followed.  
More recently, Swanson (1994) examines ways of making this model more readily 
applicable to terrestrial species by generalising the analysis to consider 
terrestrial resource allocations. He provides a theoretical framework for the 
economics of extinction that considers the elimination of species as a result of 
human choice into which resources they hold. Swanson argues that mankind has 
a ‘portfolio’ of productive assets and that substitutions are made between those 
assets (less productive assets being replaced by more productive assets) through 
a process of investment and disinvestment. 
The marginal productivity of a biological asset generally declines as population 
levels approach carrying capacity, so there is typically some identifiable optimal 
level of species stock. Whenever returns to the asset are less than the market 
rate of return, disinvestment will occur. In the case of endangered species, this 
disinvestment often takes the form of the reallocation of the primary resources 
required for species survival. 
Swanson’s model implies that the stock of a particular resource will move to the 
level that equates its rate of return to the rates of return of other competing 
assets in our portfolio. Extinction is seen as a complete disinvestment of a 
wildlife resource, which occurs because it is perceived as not being worthy of 
investment (see also Swanson and Barbier, 1992). 
These and similar models have generated important insights into the behaviour 
exhibited by resource managers, property owners and harvesters of open-access 
resources, but they are limited in the characteristics of species to which they 
apply.  For example, both the Clark and Swanson models consider only the 
consumptive value of the species in question.  Models have been developed that 
add tourism value and even existence value, but they are still driven by harvest, 
both as a principle means of value generation and as the variable through which 2 
a population is controlled by resource managers (see, for example, Bulte and van 
Kooten, 1999; Alexander, 2000). 
While there are a great many species for which these approaches do apply, there 
are many others for which they do not.  The question arises as to the applicability 
of such bioeconomic models to species for which there is no harvest value.  In 
such a case, we must consider 1) the nature and magnitude of values generated 
by the species, and 2) the nature of the control humans exercise over that species.  
The purpose of this article is to examine the affect on the standard bioeconomic 
model of changing the model assumptions such that value arises only from non-
consumptive uses and that, while growth may be density-dependent, land is the 
variable we control and so is not fixed.   
New Zealand’s yellow-eyed penguin (Megadyptes antipodes) is used as a case 
study to examine these issues.  The yellow-eyed penguin is not harvested, but 
does generate some significant tourism value.  The decline of the species arises 
principally from loss of terrestrial habitat, for which they compete with 
domesticated agricultural species.  The yellow-eyed penguin nests under brush 
on land within a kilometre of the ocean.  When that land is cleared for pasture, 
the penguin has nowhere to breed and raise its young. Thus, the control humans 
exhibit over the penguin is not in directly adding or removing stock, but in the 
provision of land needed for nesting.1 
Section 2 provides a brief review of some classic and recent density-dependent 
bioeconomic models.  The development of the non-harvest species model is shown 
in Section 3.  Finally, some general implications and conclusions are discussed in 
Section 4. 
                                                 
1 Predation from exotic species is also an issue in the decline of yellow-eyed penguin 
numbers, but will not be addressed in this article.  As penguin predators tend to favour 
the pasture-bush boundary over pure native bush, land conversion introduces both effects 
simultaneously. 3 
2. HARVEST MODELS OF EXTINCTION 
A Sole-Owner Fishery Model 
The Clark model explains the possible extinction of species as resulting from 
three factors: (1) open access to the resource, which results in overexploitation of 
the resource and the driving of economic rents to zero; (2) the relationship 
between price and marginal cost of harvesting the resource; and (3) the growth 
rate of the resource is low relative to the discount rate (Clark, 1973; see also 
Clark, 1976; Clark and Munro, 1978; Clark et al., 1979).  
If either condition one or conditions two and three are met, then resource 
extinction may result.  Condition 1 illustrates the well-known tragedy of the 
commons result in which the discount rate facing each harvester is infinite.  Any 
stock not harvested by one individual is harvested by another, so no incentive 
exists for husbandry of the resource.  Regarding conditions two and three, Clark 
adds, “if price always exceeds unit cost, and if the discount rate…is sufficiently 
large, then maximisation of present value results in extermination of the 
resource.”  
The Clark model provides a societal objective of maximising the appropriated 
return from its natural assets as follows.  
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where  x(t) is the population of the endangered species in time t, h(t) is the 
harvest of the species in time t, p(h(t)) is the inverse demand curve defined as a 
function of harvest, c(x(t)) is the unit cost of harvest as a function of the stock 
level, F(x(t)) is the growth function of the resource as a function of stock, and δ  is 
the marginal returns to capital in the society.  For notational convenience, the 
time notation will be omitted from this point on, but it is understood to be 
implicit in all control and state variables. 
To maximise its investment in this resource as well as in the other resources 
available, society balances the level of each resource against other productive 
opportunities in its ‘asset portfolio’.  When modelled in an optimal control 
framework, a set of Pontryagin necessary conditions is derived for maximisation 4 
of the objective function.  The condition associated with optimal harvest (h*) is 
shown in equation (2) and that associated with optimal Stock levels (x*) is shown 
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where λ  is the shadow value of the resource, and ε d is the elasticity of demand for 
the resource. 
Equation (3) represents a modified form of the golden rule condition common in 
renewable resource models.  In its unmodified form, the golden rule condition 
would indicate that the stock level of the resource be maintained such that the 
marginal growth rate of the renewable resource stock, F′ (x), is equal to the 
returns to the resource owners opportunity cost of capital, δ . 
This relationship suggests that if F′ (x)< δ  for all population levels, x, then 
extinction will result as the model’s optimum strategy for the resource owner.  
Only if F′ (x)= δ  at some positive population level do incentives exist to maintain a 
positive population at equilibrium. Modifications to the golden rule equation, 
such as those in equation (3), may hinder or help the slow growth species as it 
attempts to ‘pay its way’ as a competitive resource.  In this case, modifications 
include the effects of stock-dependent harvest costs,  () cx h
λ
′
− , and of the 





A Terrestrial Model 
In his 1994 paper, Swanson proposes amendments to Clark’s fishery-based model 
by including the allocation of terrestrial resources required for a species’ survival.  
Swanson points out that, while humans do not compete for many of the ocean 
resources used by marine species, they do compete for the same land-based 
resources used by terrestrial endangered species.  Thus he argues that terrestrial 
species must not only generate growth in value to compete with other capital 5 
opportunities, they must also generate growth in value to compete with the 
opportunity costs of the resources they need for survival. 
To address this, Swanson adds another control variable to the problem, which 
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where R is a unit of terrestrial resources upon which the species depends for 
survival, and ρ R is the price of a base unit of that land resource.  This method 
discards the assumption, implicit in fisheries-based models, that a species’ 
required resources are free goods that do not require investment.  This generates 
one of Swanson’s “alternative routes to extinction” through the addition of 
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Similar in concept to the golden rule equilibrium discussed above, this condition 
requires that land-based resources be allocated to a species only in proportion to 
its ability to generate a competitive return.  Note that this condition is in 
addition to those shown in equations (2) and (3) above.  When taken together, 
these conditions offer some further insight into the issues surrounding species 
extinction.  In particular, it is shown that, even when Clark’s conditions are not 
met—that is, when growth rates are greater than the discount rate or when unit 
price is less than unit cost— a species may still move toward extinction if it does 
not provide a competitive return for the natural resources it requires for 
survival.2 
                                                 
2 Swanson also introduced a similar condition, not considered here, requiring returns to 
management services. 6 
Adding Non-consumptive Values 
An important limitation of both the Clark and Swanson models is that each of 
them considers only the consumptive value of the species in question;3 that is, 
under both frameworks the species must be harvested for any benefits to be 
realised.  Yet many endangered species, such as the yellow-eyed penguin, have 
no harvest value. The models we have just seen would imply that such a species 
has no value as a resource since it is not harvested for commercial purposes.  
Alexander (2000) explores the potential for representing non-consumptive values 
of wildlife resources, using a framework arising from the Clark and Swanson 
models. The model hypothesises an objective function of a society maximising net 
social welfare by including terms to express the non-consumptive existence and 
tourism values of the African elephant (Loxodonta africanus). Acknowledging 
these non-consumptive values provides added incentives for mankind to include 
such species in our asset portfolio. The problem, though, is one of appropriation, 
as not all of these values are actually appropriated in practice. 
In a simplified analytical form of the model, the societal objective with regard to 
elephants is shown in equation (6), 
()
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where x is the elephant population, h  is harvest, PM is the value of the non-ivory 
products of harvest, PI is the value of ivory per animal, PS is the per animal value 
of safari hunting, C(x) is the unit cost of harvesting, PU is the unit price of one 
tourist day, U(x) is tourist days as a function of population, N(x) is the non-
market existence value of elephants as a function of population, PR is the unit 
value of land resources used by elephants, R x ⋅  is quantity of land resources used 
by elephants as a constant proportion of population, and F(x) is the growth rate 
of the elephant population.   
Note that, unlike the terrestrial model and the model developed in this paper, 
land resources allocated to elephants are not expressed as a control variable. 
                                                 
3 At one point, Swanson does describe the benefits in a more general sense as the “flow of 
social benefits,” but still expresses them as a function of harvest. 7 
Rather, it is suggested that, if society is subjected to the appropriate incentives 
(including the appropriation of the aforementioned tourism and existence 
values), then the market will, of its own accord, transfer such land resources 
from alternative uses. 
Using the Pontryagin conditions for maximisation of this problem, a new version 
of the golden rule equation is derived as shown in equation (7). 
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) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) (
x C P P P





′ + ′ + − ′ −
+ ′ = δ  (7) 
The LHS and the first term on the RHS carry the same golden rule interpretation 
as in the sole-owner fishery model.  All other terms on the RHS modify that 
relationship. The modifications take into account the stock-dependent terms of 
the original objective function, all expressed in proportion to the unit net revenue 
of harvesting the resource. 
The first modification term,  () () Cx Fx ′ , represents stock dependent costs and 
acts to increase equilibrium populations.4  The second term,  R P R − , acts to lower 
the effective marginal productivity of the stock by requiring the stock to meet the 
proportional returns to land available from the next best opportunity.  The third 
term is the marginal revenue from tourism.  This is one way in which the total 
value people place on elephants is expressed in the market. These revenues act to 
support the existence of the elephant as it competes against other opportunities 
in society. The fourth term is the marginal existence value, aside from any use 
value (either harvest or tourism), that people place on knowing elephant species 
continues.  As used in this model, it actually represents the marginal existence 
value that is appropriated by the resource owner, but of course few of those 
actually are appropriated. 
Inclusion of these non-consumptive values of a wildlife resource provides a fuller 
picture of the social benefits of maintaining that resource. It illustrates the 
tourism values, which require no harvest of the species, and the existence values, 
which are not accounted for in organised markets. These two types of values 
become particularly important when considering a species with no commercial 
consumptive value.  
                                                 
4  () 0 Cx ′ < , rendering the term positive. 8 
3. MODELLING NON-HARVESTED SPECIES 
The modelling of a species such as the yellow-eyed penguin is a logical next step 
in the process that has just been illustrated. Endangered species modelling began 
with Clark’s fisheries model, which was then modified by Swanson to incorporate 
the importance of terrestrial resource allocations. Alexander extends this 
framework to include non-consumptive values of wildlife resources and now we 
consider a species with no consumptive potential at all.  Of course, these three 
models do not, in any sense, provide a comprehensive review of the bioeconomic 
literature on extinction.  Rather, they define something of the conceptual 
evolution that lead to the questions addressed in this paper. 
The principle cause of the reduction in yellow-eyed penguin populations is the 
conversion of nesting habitat into farmland. This has resulted in increased 
predation of the penguin and disturbances to nesting, breeding and rearing 
habits. 
Naturally, the conversion of such land is not intended to harm the penguins; 
their fate is incidental. The land in question has simply been put to its perceived 
most productive use, as the economic incentives faced by landowners dictate their 
choices. 
The obvious questions, then, are what needs to happen if the yellow-eyed penguin 
is to avoid extinction, and can a bioeconomic model predict whether human 
behaviour is likely to act for or against eventual extinction without external 
intervention?  
We attempt to answer these questions with a new bioeconomic model in which 
the objective function represents the net returns to society, the value to be 
maximised, and the constraint represents the change over time of penguin 
populations, as a function of the current population and the land resources 
available. Many of the terms of a standard bioeconomic model no longer apply, so 
this model is significantly different from those reviewed above.  The goal of a 
society with regard to the values derived from the yellow-eyed penguin is 






e P T xLCLCL d t
δ ∞ − ⋅− ⋅− ⋅ ∫  (8) 
s.t.  ) , ( L x F x = ! , 9 
where x is the population of yellow-eyed penguins, PT is the price of one tourist 
visit to see wild penguins, T(x) is the total number of tourist visits as a function 
of population, CL is the cost per unit of land resources required by the penguin, L 
is an index of the quantity of land resources used by the penguin, and CO is the 
costs of operation of the tourism enterprise. 
The general principle behind the new model is similar to that given by Swanson 
(1994) but deviates in two important ways. The first is a lack of any harvest 
value. Since the penguin is not being hunted for food, feathers or hide, there are 
no consumptive values to incorporate into our model. A lack of tangible harvest 
return removes that incentive and, in the absence of some other value, the 
resource owner will reallocate his resources to disinvest in the non-productive 
asset. The benefits to be accrued from the yellow-eyed penguin are restricted to 
non-consumptive tourism and non-market existence values. Although some 
public efforts to preserve the species exist, this paper will focus on non-
consumptive tourism values. 
The lack of harvest has the further implication that the control variable must 
change. Traditional bioeconomic models use harvest as a control variable positing 
that a society will set harvest at that level which maximizes net social well-being. 
In our model, because our effective influence on the penguins’ preservation status 
is in the allocation of resources, the control variable is land allocation, L. The 
extent to which people assign their resources to different investment 
opportunities will influence the availability of the penguin’s required habitat 
ultimately determining the survival of the species. 
Having recognized the social objective function and growth constraints, the 
current value Hamiltonian is: 
)] , ( [ ) ( L x F L R H ⋅ + = λ  (9) 
Where  [] () () TL O R LP T x C C L =− −  represents the net benefits from tourism and 
F(x,L) represents the state equation, which in this case is just the penguin 
growth function. 
Taking the partial derivatives of the Hamiltonian with respect to the control 
variable, the state variable and the shadow price yields the following Pontryagin 
necessary conditions for a maximum: 10 
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Combining and manipulating the first two necessary conditions yields the 
following result expressed as a modified golden rule equilibrium condition: 
L L
LL L L LL
x
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We assume the growth function, F(x) is represented by a modified Verholst 
logistic function in which natural steady states exist at population levels of zero 
and the carrying capacity, k. The original (unmodified) logistic function is 
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where, r is the intrinsic growth rate of the population, x is the population, and k 
is the carrying capacity. This formulation characterises the concept of density-
dependence, in which population grows rapidly at first and then, upon reaching a 
maximum growth rate, begins to decline such that 
() 0 Fx ′ > ,  () 0 Fx ′′ <  for all 
2
k
x < , and 
() 0 Fx ′ < ,  () 0 Fx ′′ >  for all 
2
k
x > . 
The cause of this behaviour is the self-limiting nature of populations, as the 
density of a population increases and competition for available resources limits 11 
net growth.  Implicit in this formulation is the assumption of a fixed environment 
size. 
Since loss of land is the principal cause of decline in yellow-eyed penguin 
numbers, any change in the amount of land available to the penguin effectively 
alters the carrying capacity of the population on the land. Similarly, increasing 
the size of the available habitat increases the total population that the habitat is 
capable of supporting. 
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where L represents an index of the suitable habitat available to the yellow-eyed 
penguin, the control variable from above.  
Substituting equation (16) and its derivatives into equation (14) yields a specific 
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This expression is consistent with the results suggested by the previous models, 
indicating that the penguin must generate sufficient growth, not only to meet the 
opportunity cost of capital, but also to offset the opportunity cost of the land 
resources it consumes.  The specific implications for management depends upon 
the population, the intrinsic growth rate and the social discount rate. 
Since δ , r and L are all positive, the sign of the first term on the right-hand side 
is dependent on the population level as shown in equation (18).  If the population 
is small (less than one-half of the carrying capacity), the term is positive. If the 
population is large (greater than one-half of the carrying capacity), the term is 
negative. 12 
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The implication is for the sign of the second term on the right-hand side as this 
represents how we use our control over land to balance the equality as shown in 
equation (19).   
2
If a large population, then   1 0,   and    0
0  if   2
If a small population, then   1 0,   and 
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If the population is large (the first term is negative), the optimal control will be to 
increase land availability through time.  Even, if the population is small, the 
optimal control may be to increase land if the rate of growth of the population is 
less than that of other opportunities in society.  Doing so effectively shifts the 
population leftward, relative to the carrying capacity, as in a shift from X2 to X1 
in Figure 1.  This increases the marginal growth rate until the entire right-hand 


















Finally, if the population is small and the intrinsic rate of growth exceeds the 
discount rate, the optimal control will be to decrease the land allocated to the 
species.  Such a decrease has the same effect as shifting the population 
rightward, relative to the carrying capacity, as in a shift from X1 to X2 in Figure 
1.  This reduces the marginal growth rate, again bringing the right-hand side 
into equality with the discount rate. 
4. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Implications for the Penguins 
Howard McGrouther, director of the yellow-eyed penguin reserve in Dunedin 
reports that the current annual rate of growth for their population has remained 
at a constant twelve percent for the past several years5. The annual opportunity 
cost of capital facing landowners in the Otago peninsula is around 6.25 percent.6 
Clearly, the growth rate of the resource is well in excess of the rate required 
under the unmodified golden rule.  McGrouther further reports that the carrying 
capacity of the reserve is around 760 birds, with a current population of 
approximately 260 birds.  Thus, we have the case described above, in which the 
population is small and the intrinsic growth rate exceeds the discount rate. 
Accordingly, on the optimal path, the rate of change of land allocation with 
respect to time will be negative, given our current initial conditions. This implies 
that the current population density is too low on the land presently available. To 
put it another way, the current yellow-eyed penguin population on this tract of 
land could be supported on a much smaller area. 
The implication of this result for penguin management and preservation is a 
positive one. The current allocation of land to the yellow-eyed penguin is capable 
of supporting a substantially larger population than it is at present.  Although 
the model indicates that the same result could be achieved with less, it is 
                                                 
5 Personal Communication 11-11-98. 14 
unrealistic to treat land allocation as an infinitely divisible resource that can be 
gradually increased to keep pace with the optimal population density. 
Implications for the Model 
The question remains as to the applicability of the bioeconomic model to this type 
of problem.  We have really explored two issues: whether the model is useful for 
species for which there is no harvest value, and whether land is an acceptable 
control variable. 
To the first, the model demonstrates the ability to deal with non-harvest values 
as the sole source of value in the model.  Previous models have included non-
consumptive values in addition to harvest, but this model provides a reasonable 
explanation of optimal economic behaviour based on non-consumptive values 
alone.  However, it is also the case that this model dramatically simplified the 
nature of revenues arising from tourism values.  For mathematical tractability, 
revenues were modelled as constant and not dependent on population.  While 
this is probably not correct, it is also the case that revenues are not likely to be 
based on an infinitely increasing function of population.  In all likelihood, 
tourism revenues for a particular location will increase for low populations, but 
after some point, will level off.  A tourist may choose not to pay for a visit if the 
probability of a sighting is small, but once that probability reaches a level of 
near-certainty, additional population is not likely to generate additional visits.  
The model would have to be significantly more complex to take this behaviour 
into account, yet that may be necessary for the model to predict behaviour in a 
useful way. 
As to using land as a control variable, Swanson (1994) has already demonstrated 
the conceptual value of considering land as an additional control variable.  This 
model demonstrates that land may also be a reasonable choice as the sole control 
variable in a problem.  If there is a weakness in the concept it is in the 
unrealistic result that an optimal decision will be to restrict land initially and to 
introduce land at a rate that holds the population at an optimal density.  In 
hindsight, it is obvious why the model does this, and it is an economically sound 
result.  However, it is not a particularly realistic scenario for the real world and 
                                                                                                                                             
6 T e r m  I n v e s t m e n t  R a t e  f o r  t e r m  i n  e x c e s s  o f  f i v e  y e a r s  a s  q u o t e d  b y  B a n k  o f  N e w  
Zealand, Palmerston North Branch, as of 18 January 1999. 15 
so one must question its use in empirical applications.  It is likely that such a 
model is better used for making a binary determination of whether or not the 
incentives facing land owners is likely to cause a total disinvestment in a 
particular species and its habitat, than for attempting to model specific 
optimising behaviour. 16 
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